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Symbol of Freedom:




Too many wrongly characterize the debate as "security versus
privacy." The real choice is liberty versus control. Tyranny,
whether it arises under threat of foreign physical attack or under
constant domestic authoritative scrutiny, is still tyranny. Liberty
requires security without intrusion, security plus privacy.., we
should champion privacy even when we have nothing to hide.
Bruce Schneier The Eternal Value of Privacy, 2006
On September 11, 2001, foreign terrorists hijacked and flew
American jetliners into buildings in New York and Washington
D.C., causing widespread destruction. In the aftermath, the U.S.
experienced an aviation security awakening, marked by a drastic
shift in how the U.S. approach and negotiate security issues within
the modem aviation system. As the world becomes more
technologically and socially connected, security has become an
increasingly complex domestic concern. In particular, domestic
efforts to ensure security require some modification or reduction of
individual rights. Following the September 11th ("9-11") terrorist
attacks, the U.S. has struggled with balancing differing standards of
individual rights with domestic security in an increasingly
international airline industry.
As the world becomes more interdependent, and threats to
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the
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security grow, there is a rising need for international cooperation to
battle security threats.' Efforts to build international agreements,
however, are balanced against domestic laws protecting individual
rights. Notwithstanding their shared emphasis on individual rights,
the U.S. and the EU have taken very different approaches to the
protection of individual rights within the context of international
and domestic security. 2
The U.S and EU share a similar need for state security and both
maintain strong protections for individual privacy. However, this
note argues that in the dichotomy between state security and data
privacy rights, the U.S. and EU maintain opposing views. In the
U.S., state security acts as a catch-all: Once the government claims
the need for state security, it will trump domestic privacy rights. By
contrast, in the EU, the privacy rights are given more protection and
the government has a higher burden to meet in order to trump
individual rights. This note argues that the relative importance and
protections afforded to privacy rights impacts the ability of domestic
governments to negotiate successful international agreements that
increase domestic and global state security.
This note will explore and address these different approaches
within the context of the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security
Act ("ATSA"),3 which requires the collection and transfer of airline
passenger personal data. First, this note analyzes the history and
the extent of U.S. and EU privacy laws as they relate to airline
passenger data transfers and collection. Second, it examines efforts
by the U.S. and EU to come to an agreement for the transfer of
passenger data within the context of differing domestic privacy
requirements and laws. Finally, it explores the tensions between
U.S. and EU legal values and how different concepts of individual
rights, as they relate to personal privacy, affect international treaty
creation.
1. The U.S. has arguably been involved in fighting international terrorism for
decades. For a condensed discussion of the history of U.S. efforts to curb
international terrorism, see Noam Chomsky, International Terrorism: Image and
Reality, in WESTERN STATE TERRORISM (Alexander George ed., 1991) available at
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199112--02.htm.
2. See GUIDO DE RUGGIERO & R. G. COLLINGWOOD, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN
LIBERALISM, (Beacon Press 1959), which explores the formation, evolution, and the
influences of England, Germany, Italy, and France throughout Europe.
3. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 587 (Nov. 21, 2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. §
114; 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 8331; 26 U.S.C. § 9502; 31 U.S.C. § 1105) [hereinafter ATSA].
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To that end, Part II of this note will briefly detail the
evolution of the ATSA with a focus on U.S. and EU efforts to
comply. Part III addresses the theory of conflict and how states
balance between individual privacy rights and efforts to increase
state security. Part IV will focus on EU privacy laws, as detailed in
EU Directive 95/46/ED ("the Directive"), 4 which the EU ratified in
1995. Also known as the Data Protection Directive, the Directive
outlines the nature and the extent of individual data privacy rights
within the EU and limitations on data transfer to third-party
countries. Part V will examine U.S. privacy laws as they relate to
individual passenger data privacy, with a special focus on the post
9-11 reduction of passenger privacy rights and the emergence of
class action lawsuits against airlines. Part VI will compare U.S. and
EU approaches to privacy laws and security. Part VII applies these
different approaches and details efforts made by both the U.S. and
the EU to come to an ATSA agreement, including some of the
political problems that both sides faced. The focus will be on the
tension between the U.S. and EU regarding the conceptualization of
individual rights and how it affected the parties'
acceptance/ rejection of this international agreement. In Part VIII,
this note will explore how domestic politics are able to undermine
valid international treaties and laws and explore possible avenues
for effective negotiations.
II. ATSA: Basic Overview of Law and Conflict
Believing that stronger intelligence, agency communication,
and shared data collection would have provided adequate notice of
the 9-11 attacks, the U.S. legislature passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act in 2001.5 The ATSA created and
empowered the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") to
4. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). In the European
Union, Directives provide guidelines that detail a desired result but leave the
implementation/details to the authorities of the individual nations. Directives have
the dual ability to be binding on the member states while simultaneously securing
uniformity of domestic laws of member states. See, e.g., Select Committee on
European Scrutiny, Report, 2001-2, H.C. 173-I, at 32, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk. See generally Consolidated Versions of the
Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E/1) art. 2.
5. ATSA, supra note 3.
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make numerous industry changes to maximize domestic security. 6
In particular, the TSA is charged with evaluating all passengers
boarding an aircraft using a computer-assisted passenger
prescreening system ("CAPPS").7 Using its broad authority, the
TSA requires that all domestic airlines provide Passenger Name
Records ("PNR") prior to boarding.8 PNRs are the "reservation
information contained in an air carrier's electronic reservation
system and/or departure control system that sets forth the identity
and travel plans of each passenger." 9
Of particular importance within the international realm was the
ATSA's amendment to §44909,10 which required that all foreign
airlines flying to or over American territory to electronically provide
PNRs to the U.S. Commissioner of Customs."
Under the ATSA, all foreign crew and passenger manifests
must contain:
* The full name of each passenger and crew member;12
* The date of birth and citizenship of each passenger and
crew member; 3
* The sex of each passenger and crew member;14
6. The ATSA heightened domestic security measures by: 1) requiring federal
agencies to increase screening of airport perimeters, planes, passengers, and
baggage; 2) requiring that secure doors be installed in all aircrafts between the
flight deck and passenger compartments (§ 44903); 3) requiring crew training in
terrorism identification and security measures (§ 44918); 4) limiting the ability of
foreign nationals and/or aliens or other designated individuals to obtain flight
training for crafts exceeding the 12,500-pound take-off weight (§ 44939).
7. See ATSA, supra note 3, § 449030)(2).
8. 19 C.F.R. 122. 49b(c) (2004). In addition to ATSA requirements, Air carriers
must disclose thirty-four items including: date of reservation, date(s) of intended
travel, passenger name, number of travelers, seat information, address, payment
information, billing address, telephone numbers, frequent flyer information, travel
agency, travel status of passenger, one-way ticket or free ticket identifiers, email
address, ticket number, date of issuance, no show history, number of bags, bag tag
numbers, voluntary/involuntary upgrades, and date of birth. Undertakings of the
United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the United States
Transportation Security Administration, at Appendix A, available at http://
www.statewatch.org.
9. 19 C.F.R. § 122.49b(b) (2004).
10. ATSA, supra note 3, § 115(c)(5).
11. Id. § 115(c)(1).
12. Id. § 115(c)(2)(A).
13. Id. § 115(c)(2)(B).
14. Id. § 115(c)(2)(C).
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* The passport number and country of issuance for each
passenger and crew member, if required for travel;15
* The U.S. visa number or resident alien card number for
each passenger and crew member, as applicable;16
• Any "other information as the Under Secretary, in
consultation with the Commissioner of Customs,
determines is reasonably necessary to secure aviation
safety."'17
As with domestic PNRs, the ATSA requires that all foreign air
carriers entering or leaving the U.S. provide the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection ("CBP") and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") with electronic access to PNRs.18
Specifically, CBP may electronically access the PNR data from air
carriers' reservation systems located within the territory of the
Member States of the EU
III. Rights vs. Security: the Theory of Conflict
Compliance with the ATSA requirements is a contentious issue
between the U.S. and EU members primarily due to differences in
how the U.S. and EU balance individual rights versus state security.
Compared to the U.S., EU countries have stronger enumerated
individual data privacy rights. Thus, it was questionable whether
the European airlines could comply with ATSA requirements
without violating EU's own privacy laws. Within the EU, data
privacy and transfers are governed by the Directive, which
mandates strong protection of individual privacy rights and limited
governmental access. European airlines were in a dilemma: either
they could transfer passenger data in compliance with U.S. law and
be subjected to EU penalties,19 or they could refuse to transfer
15. Id. § 115(c)(2)(D).
16. Id. § 115(c)(2)(E).
17. Id. § 115(c)(2)(F).
18. Caitlin Friedemann, Legislative Development: Council Decision Regarding
Agreement Between the European Community and the United States on the Use of
Passenger Name Record Data, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 207, 209 (2004).
19. Council Directive, supra note 4, art. 2. Directive 95/46 allows member states
to set their own conditions, minimum requirements, and penalties against those
who are "the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body
which alone or jointly... determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data." See also Arnulf S. Gubitz, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001 in Conflict with the EU Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to
2009]
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passenger data per the ATSA and face U.S. imposed fines or the
revocation of landing rights within the U.S.20
Maintenance of national security, especially in the face of global
threats, is an essential element of state preservation and sovereignty.
Tensions often exist between respecting individual rights and
freedoms and ensuring the preservation of the state. State efforts to
ensure sovereignty and security require the implementation of
measures - in terms of laws, regulations, and sanctions - that
necessarily restrict the rights and freedoms of individuals. Finding
the balance between individual rights and state security is often
difficult; restrictive state actions are often criticized as violating the
rule of law, lacking sufficient checks and balances, and
encompassing unnecessary or dangerous restrictions on
constitutional rights.21 Thus, increases in state security usually
result in a reduction or limitation of individual liberties.22
Following the passage of the ATSA, questions arose regarding
the role of state encroachment onto individual rights, especially as
they relate to privacy. These questions are whether individual
rights and freedoms should be restricted, and whether the
restrictions can be justified for the sake of national security.
Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. "awoke to the
growing threat posed by terrorist organizations with global reach
and the probability of additional terrorist attacks on U.S. soil." 23 It
Airline Passenger Data Does the United States Need to Combat Terrorism?, 39 New Eng.
L. Rev. 431, 449 n.11-13 (2005).
20. 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.14(d)(5), 122.161 (2004).
21. For instance, violations of individual privacy such as censorship, mass
surveillance, and wiretapping can be justified as necessary for national security
purposes. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA PATRIOT Act,
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
22. See e.g., Security and Human Rights (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus
eds., Hart Publishing 2007). There has been a new wave of research and discourse
arguing that the state security/human right dichotomy is both inaccurate and
unhelpful. Researchers, NGOs and non-profits have been arguing that state
security can exist within the confines of both protecting and promoting human
rights. The theory is that human security [which combines state security and
human elements] is something that can be promoted by the state, within the
confines of state security, and while maximizing human liberties. For more
information, see Asia-Pacific Politics: Hegemony vs. Human Security (Joseph
Camilleri et al. eds., Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007).
23. General Charles G. Boyd, Foreword to RUSSELL HOWARD, JAMES FOREST &




was quickly realized that national security required broad and
effective engagement in the international arena24:
No longer an abstract concept about conflicts fought in far-away
lands, [U.S.] national security now includes safeguarding our
public spaces, our economic infrastructure, our transportation and
information networks and our public confidences. Because
American infrastructure interconnects industry, public services
and private citizens, an attack on a single point causes a ripple
effect for all Americans ... [thus making] our government's
central role.., the collective security of the American people at
home. 25
With this, a "domestic/ global security state" has begun to
emerge to "reduce the vulnerability of people and complex systems
to catastrophic disruption and destruction through intentional and
accidental acts." 26 The "domestic/global security state" evolved
with the increase in international interdependency and events that
impact the domestic state. The domestic security state, which
developed out of both real and perceived internal threats to the
nation, is evolutionary in that it is rooted in the American system of
government, which emphasizes and responds to changes in
constitutionalism, liberty, separation of power, due process, equal
protection, and individual rights. 27 However, regardless of its
evolutionary ability, the domestic security state is unable to combat
the threats of terrorism that are increasingly rooted in other
countries. 28 As the world becomes more globally interconnected
through economies, technology, and culture, the fight for domestic
security must necessarily include global security concerns. 29
24. Stephen G. Cochran, Enhanced National Security through International Research
Collaborations, Sci. & Tech. R., Mar. 2005, https://www.llnl.gov/str/
March05/ComMar05.html.
25. Howard et al., supra note 23.
26. JAMES D. CARROLL, DEVELOPING THE DOMESTIc SECURITY STATE, IN MEETING
THE CHALLENGE OF 9/11 BLUEPRINTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 72 (Thomas
H. Stanton ed., M.E. Sharpe 2006).
27. Id. at 73.
28. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, 105TH CONG., REPORT: COUNTERING
THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, available at http://www.
fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html. See, e.g., NORA BENSAHEL, THE COUNTER-
TERROR COALITIONS: COOPERATION wrrH EUROPE, NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
(RAND 2003), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph
-reports/2005/MR1746.pdf.
29. See generally PETER BERGER & SAMUEL HUNTING, MANY GLOBALIZATIONS
(Oxford Press 2002). See also Audrey Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and
2009]
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The "domestic/ global security state" depends largely on
improved and advanced intelligence gathering, which impacts
domestic individual rights. It has been generally recognized that
defense, foreign policy intelligence, and domestic intelligence are
governed by different cultures, principles, laws, regulations, and
processes. 30 But, to address international terrorism, there must be a
convergence of defense and domestic intelligence. Defense
intelligence can be of "crucial significance for domestic action and
vice versa." 31 Consequently, new rules, principles, and methods of
information gathering and sharing need to be developed to facilitate
information sharing.3 2  The "domestic/global security state"
engages in information gathering that must be balanced against
domestic individual rights, such as privacy rights, which often come
into conflict with domestic and international efforts to ensure
security.33 As a result, through differences in case law and statutes,
the U.S. and EU have taken very different approaches to the
protection of individual privacy rights within the collection, storage,
and transfer of personal data. The following sections highlight these
differences.
IV. EU Data Privacy Laws
The EU has a rich history of protecting and respecting
individual's data privacy rights. On December 10, 1948, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.34 These rights were formulated in response to the
horrors of World War II, where among other things personal
International Terrorism, Int'l Security, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002-03).
30. Carroll, supra note 26, at 78.
31. Id.
32. This need has been recognized by the government. See generally US General
Accounting Office, Testimony of David M. Walker to the Senate Committed on
Intelligence, Homeland Security Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges (Sept. 23, 2002).
33. Carroll, supra note 26, at n. 4. See generally statements of Robert S. Mueller,
FBI Director, projecting that the FBI will become "part of an official international
terrorism alliance similar to NATO." Furthermore, he "envisioned the FBI of
tomorrow as a highly trained, electronically sophisticated, internationally
networked organization that has terrorism as its principal target . . . . Soon all
counterterrorism functions will be intelligence-driven operations with law
enforcement sanctions as an ancillary aspect."
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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information, which was initially collected for innocent purposes,
became a "tool of oppression in the hands of a powerful
government." 35 Under Article 12 of the Declaration, individual
privacy was protected against "arbitrary interference" by the
government.36
Over the next thirty years, the need for regional guidelines to
harmonize amongst national data protection legislations became
increasingly necessary. Efforts to harmonize domestic laws, and
thereby reduce trade disputes throughout Europe, began with the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") (formerly the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) under the Marshall Plan).37 The focus of the
OECD was to "develop Guidelines which would help to harmonize
national privacy legislation and, while upholding such human
rights, at the same time prevent interruptions in international flows
of data."38
Efforts to further protect individual data privacy, especially
following the OECD Guidelines, was furthered by the Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data ("APPD").39 Under the
APPD, individual data was protected from arbitrary and
indiscriminate collection and third-party or transborder transfer.40
As mentioned above, the EU ratified the Directive in 1995. The
main goals of the Directive were to ensure the unrestricted
movement of personal data among member states while
35. See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An
International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice, http://www.gilc.org/privacy/
survey.
36. Id.
37. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD],
History, available at http://www.oecd.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). See also
Harvard Univ., The "Marshall Plan" Speech (June 5,1947).
38. OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_
1815186 1 1 _1,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
39. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, ETS no. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm ("[I]t is desirable to
extend the safeguards for everyone's rights and fundamental freedoms, and in
particular the right to the respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow
across frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic processing.").
40. Id. arts. 5, 6, and 8.
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simultaneously protecting individual rights via a high level of
protection of personal data within the EU 41 Because directives
provide only guidelines and are not binding, the Commission
remained concerned about data security due to differences in
domestic laws within EU member states.42 Since the Directive was
subject to member state review, some states took a very strict
approach to third party data transfers, while others were more
relaxed. 43
A. Requirements and Protections under the Directive
The Directive provides ground rules for individual data privacy
and applies to both electronic and paper filing systems.44 It begins
by laying down basic privacy principles, starting with the idea that
data information should be collected for specific, legitimate
purposes, stored no longer than necessary, and further protected
upon transfer to third party countries. The goal is to "protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data" while also bolstering the "free flow of personal
data."45
Under Section 6 of the Directive, member states - and the
controller specifically 46 - are required to ensure the fair, accurate,
lawful, and legitimate storage and transfer of individual data.
Specifically, all personal data must be 1) "processed fairly and
lawfully"; 2) collected for "specified, explicit, and legitimate
purpose" and not processed in ways incompatible with this purpose
unless "appropriate" domestic safeguards are utilized; 3) "adequate,
relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which [it]
was collected/processed"; 4) accurate (with inaccurate or
incomplete data being erased or rectified); and 5) kept and stored in
a manner that permits identification of individuals for "no longer
41. Commission First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection
Directive, at 3, COM (2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2003/com2003_0265en01.pdf.
42. Id. at 10 (stating that "the implementation of a Directive of this kind, that is
a Directive leaving a considerable latitude to the Member States, but also requiring
them to fill in a significant amount of detail, is undoubtedly a complex task.").
43. Id. at 11.
44. Council Directive, supra note 4, at art. 3(1).
45. Id. arts. 1 & 2.
46. See supra text accompanying note 19.
[Vol. 32:2
Symbol of Freedom
than necessary for the purposes for which the data was collected." 47
Any collection of private data requires unambiguous individual
consent unless the data falls within one of several explicit
exceptions.48 Although the controller does not need consent, they
do need to provide disclosure to the individual whose information
is being collected when data processing is necessary for the
following reasons: 1) the performance or entrance of a contract; 2)
the controller to comply with their legal obligation; 3) protecting the
vital interests of the data subject; 4) the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or within the exercise of official
authority vested in either the controller or designated third party; 5)
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or third party.49 Even
within these narrow exceptions, the individual retains the right to
contest the collection and the transmission of their private
information for any legitimate reason.5 0
Under Section 3, Article 8, special safeguards are instituted for
the collection and transmission of sensitive passenger data, such as
race or ethnic origins and religious or political affiliations. Overall,
member states are prohibited from "processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing
of data concerning health or sex life."51 The Directive made an
explicit exception for the processing of personal data obtained and
used to further "public security, defense, State security (including
the economic well-being of the State when the processing operation
relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in
areas of criminal law."52 However, even within this exception, any
collected data must be narrowly-related to the reason collected and
strict retention guidelines are ensured. 53 As such, the collection and
transmission of personal data can only occur on a case-by-case basis
when supported by informed and legitimate suspicion.5 4
47. Id. art. 6
48. Id. art. 7 (a).
49. Id. art. 7 (b)-(f)
50. Id. arts. 7 (f) & 14.
51. Id. art. 8(1).
52. Id. art. 3(2).
53. Council Directive, supra note 4, at art. 6(1)(c)-(e).
54. "Member States shall provide that personal data must be: (b) collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes." Id. art. 6(1)(b).
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B. Data Transfers to Third-Party Countries
Article 25 of the Directive enables EU member countries and
controllers, such as airlines, to transfer individual data to third party
countries.5   However, data can only be transferred once it is
determined that the third-party has an "adequate level of
protection" of the private information. 56 This requires a case-by-
case determination of the nature of the data, the purpose and
duration of the operation, the country of origin/destination, utilized
rules of law and profession, and security measures employed within
the third country.5 7 Similar to Article 7, Article 25 of the Directive
makes an express exception, even without an adequate level of
protection, that allows data transfers to a third country to fulfill a
contract in which the data subject is a party.58
If a third country fails to meet an adequate level of protection,
member states will act to prevent any transfer of that type of data to
the third party.59 The European Commission and member countries
then have the ability to negotiate with the third country to remedy
any breach of privacy and work to reinstate the flow of information
upon the showing of adequate protection of "the private lives and
basic freedoms and rights of individuals." 60 Negotiations are
undertaken either to bring the third country into an agreement to
comply with the Directive or to convince the third country to
modify their domestic laws.61
In order to better identify and negotiate with third countries,
the European Commission set up the "Working party on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal
Data," commonly known as the "Article 29 Working Party." The
Working Party has the "power to determine, on the basis of Article
25(6) of the Directive whether a third country ensures an adequate
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or of the
international commitments it has entered into."62 The Working
55. Id. art. 25.
56. Id. art. 25(1).
57. Id. art. 25(2).
58. Id. art. 25.
59. Id. art. 25(4).
60. Id. art. 25(5)-(6).
61. Id. art. 25(4)-(5).
62. European Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection
of Personal Data in Third Countries: Overview, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/
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Party has determined that "personal data can flow from the twenty-
five EU member states and three EEA member countries (Norway,
Liechtenstein and Iceland) to a third country without any further
safeguard being necessary." 63 In addition, limited data has been
approved for third party transfer to the U.S. as long as the data falls
under the safeguards of the U.S. Department of Commerce's Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles.64
V. U.S. Data Privacy Laws
Unlike the EU, the U.S. has no comprehensive privacy law.65
Although courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution as providing
unenumerated privacy rights, the scope and extent of these rights
are unclear and are explored on a case-by-case basis. The basic right
to privacy received explicit discussion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
where the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance" which give individuals a right to privacy. 66 The right to
privacy has been explored in a number of other cases following
Griswold.67
However, the strongest indicator of U.S. privacy rights is found
not in case law, but in statutes. Generally, American personal data
collection and transfers are regulated by the Privacy Act of 1974, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), and the
2002 Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").68 These laws have been
interpreted as limiting actions of the government, but not
privacy/thridcountries/index.en.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 461, 471 (2000).
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
67. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-
22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 644
(1951); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
68. It should be noted that other privacy bills, such as the Personal Information
Privacy Act of 2001 and Defense of Privacy Act, were introduced in Congress with
the goal of strengthening personal privacy rights, but they were never enacted into
law.
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necessarily those of private industries or businesses.69
A. Privacy Case Law
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the
dichotomy between state security and individual privacy law, lower
courts have recognized broad powers of the state to maintain
security in the face of global threats.70 To the same degree, courts
have recognized a strong individual right to privacy. There is a
dearth of case law examining the intersection between state security
measures and individual privacy rights.
Courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution and case law to
grant individual protection from governmental intrusion. However,
in terms of privacy, the strongest protections have been toward
individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.71 The foremost
case addressing the scope of individual privacy is Griswold v.
Connecticut, where the court held that the "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance [and these]
[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy." 72 Moreover, Griswold
explained:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
69. See, e.g., Drew Shenkman, Comment, Flying the Not-So-Private Skies: How
Passengers' Personal Information Privacy Stopped at the Airplane Door, and Ahat (If
Anything) May Be Done to Get It Back, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 667 (2007) (outlining
class action attempts against airlines for privacy violations and the inability of class
action claims to succeed).
70. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). See generally Military
Commissions Act; Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224;
Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241.
71. See supra note 66. (Griswold as constitutionally protecting individual privacy
rights).
72. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
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detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."73
The Court went on to argue that each of these Bill of Rights
guarantees had an underlying theme of individual privacy 74 that
ensured an unenumerated privacy right against the state's need for
safety and security. Accordingly, the Court has stated that [e]ven
though the governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 75
This discussion was furthered in Roe v. Wade, where the
Supreme Court extended the right to privacy to protect against
encroachment, not only by the federal government, 76 but also by
state governments. 77 In Roe, the Court stated that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state actions
that violate an individual right to privacy. 78 Although the Roe Court
does not recognize an unfettered right to privacy,79 they did
recognize that the "right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, exists under the Constitution."80
In order for the state to validly infringe on these zones of privacy,
the state must have a "compelling" interest in the regulated activity
that is narrowly tailored to achieving a legitimate state end.81 The
73. Griswold at 484.
74. Id. (stating "The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its self-
incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides that the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.")
75. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
76. See supra note 66. (Griswold which only addressed the right to privacy
against the federal government and did not address the role of states or the
Fourteenth Amendment).
77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-67.
78. Id. at 153.
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id. at 152.
81. Id. at 155-56. See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
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state interest is necessarily balanced against the individual right.8 2
This standard places a high burden on the state to show that its
reason for limiting individual privacy is based on more than a slight
or even important reason.
Roe identifies a strong individual right to privacy that is
protected from overarching or expansive regulations, by either the
federal or state government, that are not narrowly tailored and
based on a compelling state interest. In applying this standard to
the ATSA, it is clear that state security and protecting society against
terrorism is a compelling governmental interest. However, there are
questions as to whether the ATSA, which requires a broad and
unfettered access to all passenger data as opposed to limiting data
collection to some of the more high-risk passengers, is narrowly
tailored enough to justify governmental intrusion on individual
privacy rights.
B. Privacy Statutes
In accordance with the Supreme Court's constitutional
recognition of individual privacy rights, Congress has enacted
statutes that guide and limit the ability of the government to collect,
store, and transfer personal data. As mentioned above, the Privacy
Act of 1974, the ECPA, and the FOIA83 have been the main U.S. laws
governing the use, collection, and transfer of data by third parties.
Although these laws intended to strengthen personal data privacy
rights, in actuality, they have provided lenient access to a great
number of governmental and private agencies. As a result,
individual passenger privacy rights in the U.S. are weaker than
those in the EU
C. The Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 was instituted because "[tihe Bill of
Rights guarantees to each American protections which we equate
with specific rights of citizenship in a free society [and] [t]his
legislation is a major first step in a continuing effort to define the
'penumbra' of privacy which emanates from specific guarantees in
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500,
508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
83. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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the Bill of Rights and which helps to give them life and substance as
recognized in Griswold."8 4
The purpose of the Privacy Act was two-fold. First, it was
intended to protect personal information from government agency
access and to enable individuals to review and correct agency
information.85  Under the Act, governmental agencies were
prohibited from transferring personal and private information to
third parties without the individual's consent, except for twelve
explicit exceptions.86 These exceptions, however, were quite broad
and allowed many different agencies and people to access a person's
data without their consent. For instance, private data could be
transferred for census 87 and statistical data keeping,88 upon the
request of law enforcement 9 or any other agency on a "need to
know" basis,90 for debt collection,91 and individual "health and
safety." 92 The most controversial exception is that for "routine
uses,"93 which under subsection (a)(7) is defined as any use "with
respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected." Congress intended that "routine uses" would "permit
other than intra-agency disclosures" and that therefore "[i]t is not
necessary... to include intra-agency transfers in the portion of the
system notice covering routine uses."94 As such, Congress provided
no strong prohibitions or limitations on the transfer of personal data
under the Privacy Act and many different agencies and people are
able to gain access to a person's data without their consent. 95
84. U.S Congress, Joint House Committee on Governmental Operations.
Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Public Law 93-579) Source
Book on Privacy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 4.
85. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
86. Id. § 552a(b).
87. Id. § 552a(b)(4).
88. Id. § 552a(b)(5).
89. Id. § 552a(b)(7).
90. Id. § 552a(b)(1).
91. Id. § 552a(b)(12).
92. Id. § 552a(b)(8).
93. Id. § 552a(b)(3).
94. OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741-42 (Dec. 4, 1975).
95. "Of particular import with regard to interpretation of the Privacy Act is the
absence of any formal conference report by a conference committee. Normally,
after the conferees have reached an agreement on all proposed amendments, their
recommendations are incorporated in a report which is signed by a majority of the
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D. The ECPA
The ECPA was enacted in 198696 in response to public concerns
over electronic privacy. The ECPA was as an amendment to Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196897 (the
"Wiretap Statute") in order to prevent unauthorized governmental
access to private electronic communications. 98 The ECPA regulated
domestic surveillance and was separated into three areas: the
Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Act,99 and the Stored Communications
Act.1 00
The Wiretap Act bars the intentional use, interception, or
disclosure of electronic or wire communication without an
applicable exception.101 It allows companies and the government to
monitor communications in order to "combat fraud and theft of
service.102  This monitoring must be reasonable, and not
conferees and entered into the House and Senate records with the adoption of the
comproriise bill. Due to the impending close of the 93rd session of Congress,
however, there was no formal conference committee in the case of the Privacy Act.
As a result, an analysis of the compromise amendments, as agreed upon by selected
members of the two chambers during the informal discussions, was prepared by
various staff members as an alternative to a conference report. Copies of this
analysis, with several (possibly significant) differences, were inserted into the
Congressional Record, in the Senate by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. on December 17,
1974 and in the House by Representative William S. Moorhead on December 18,
1974. As a result, when investigating the legislative history of the Privacy Act, both
the House and the Senate analyses of the compromise amendments must be
considered." Arthur A. Bushkin & Samuel I. Schaen, The Privacy Act of 1974 A
Reference Manual for Compliance (System Development Corporation 1975), available
at http://www.cavebear.com/archive/nsf-dns/pa-history.htm.
96. ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Oct. 21, 1986).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1968).
98. Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1557, 1564-65 (2004).
99. Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006) (regulating the collection and
storage of numbers dialed).
100. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1264, 1279 (2004).
101. US Patriot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2006).
102. United States v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also
U.S. Patriot Act, supra note 101, § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006) (permitting "an operator of a
switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic
communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or
electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the
normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire
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continuous,103 so that it balances the need for security with the
protection of individual privacy rights in their communications. 104
As a result, providers are unable to provide the government
evidence of crimes that are unrelated to the provider's particular
right or property 0 5
The Stored Communications Act ("SCA") regulates the storage
of electronic data and communications, such as emails and other
transfers of data between private parties.106 The SCA was intended
to prohibit a provider "from knowingly divulging the contents of
any communication while in electronic storage by that service to any
person other than the addressee or intended recipient." 10 7 Under the
SCA, it is an offense for a governmental official to "intentionally
access[] without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided" or to "intentionally exceed[] an
authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtain [an]
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system."108 With the passage of the U.S. Patriot Act in 2001, some of
the SCA provisions were expanded to allow the government to
conduct domestic surveillance. 109
E. The FOIA
Under the FOIA, any individual, regardless of country of
residence, had the right to request access to federal agency records
or information unless protected from disclosure pursuant to an
communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random
monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.").
103. United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 1976) ("This authority of
the telephone company to intercept and disclose wire communications is not
unlimited.").
104. See United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345, 1351 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The federal
courts ... have construed the statute to impose a standard of reasonableness upon
the investigating communication carrier.").
105. Id. at 1352.
106. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2703 (2006).
107. S. Rep. No. 99-541(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3591. See also
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that SCA "reflects
Congress's judgment that users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of
communications in electronic storage at a communications facility").
108. See supra note 106, § 2701(a)(1)-(2).
109. U.S. Patriot Act, supra note 101. See also ACLU v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656, 666
(2004) (holding that it is constitutional under the First and Fourth Amendments for
the FBI to compel certain service providers to disclose customer records).
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exemption or exclusion.110 A federal agency can legally withhold an
individual's record or information where the information is
authorized "to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy."l This is especially true when the record contains
trade secrets, commercial or financial information,112 personnel files,
or medical files.n 3 In addition, an individual's records may be
withheld if they were complied by law enforcement, would
endanger lives, expose an informant, detail agency functioning,
invade personal privacy, or interfere with an individual's right to a
fair trial.1 4  Courts have also allowed agencies to withhold
information when producing such information would lessen the
ability of the government to obtain "necessary" information in the
future." 5
F. U.S. Privacy Laws: Security over Individual Rights
In comparison to the EU's strong personal and data privacy
laws under the Directive, the U.S. is considered to have inadequate
protection for personal data." 6 Currently, the ECPA, FOIA, and
Privacy Act of 1974 still govern the bulk of U.S. passenger data
storage and collection. Congress intended these laws to strengthen
individual privacy rights; however, the courts have interpreted the
legal language to allow broad access to individual data.
A common theme throughout each of these laws is that the
governmental need for security trumps individual privacy rights.
This is evident in the Privacy Act of 1974, which was passed
specifically to help define the penumbra privacy set forth in
Griswold. The consent exception for "routine uses" has been the
most litigated exception under the Privacy Act. The courts have
given an agency's interpretation of "routine uses" a great deal of
deference. 117 Various types of individual data transfers have been
110. See supra note 85, § 552 (b)(1)(A).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 552 (b)(4).
113. Id. § 552 (b)(6).
114. Id. § 552 (b)(7)(A-F).
115. Inner City Press/Crnty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 463 F.3d 239, 244 (2006).
116. See Solveig Singleton, Privacy and Human Rights: Comparing the United States
to Europe, CATO Institute, Dec. 1, 1999, http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?
publid=5082.
117. See Dep't of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, I11. v. FLRA, 104 F.3d 1396,
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upheld by the courts under the Privacy Act, many of which have to
do with agency investigations and security measures. 1 8
The ability of governmental security measures to trump
individual privacy rights, especially as it relates to disclosure of
data, is also evidenced in the court's approach to the FOIA
protections. The Court has stated that "[t]he government has a
compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information
important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligence service."" 9 As such, deference is given to domestic
security agencies when deciding not to provide requested data in
compliance with FOIA requirements. "The appearance of
confidentiality would hardly be enhanced if sources and future
sources were to learn that their safety, and often their lives, was to
depend upon judicial oversight." 120
Deference is similarly given to the protections afforded by the
ECPA. Recently, airline passengers brought class action suits
claiming that U.S. airlines violated ECPA data privacy restrictions.
Specifically, JetBlue Airways,121  American Airlines, 122  and
Northwest Airlines' 23 have been involved in class action litigation
1402 (D.C. Cir. 1997); FLRA v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446,
1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
118. See e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093,
1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (disclosure of criminal investigative records to judicial
committee investigating judge); United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir.
1981) (records submitted by individual to parole officer became part of Justice
Department files and Department's use in criminal investigation are considered
routine use); Brown v. FBI, No. 87-C-9982, 1988 WL 79653, at 1 (N.D. Ill. July 25,
1988) (disclosure of rap sheet to local police department); Harper v. United States,
423 F. Supp. 192, 198-99 (D.S.C. 1976) (IRS's disclosure of plaintiff's identity to other
targets of investigation).
119. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
120. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
121. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); Privacy Rights Clearinghouse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. D045568, 2005
WL 3118798 at 1 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005).
122. In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(American 1) (dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to show a valid breach of contract
claim), reh'g granted after amended complaint, In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig.,
No. 3:04-MD-1627-D, 2005 WL 3323028 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (American II) (dismissed
Plaintiff's ECPA claims with prejudice and without leave to replead).
123. In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D.
Minn. June 6, 2004); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D.
2004).
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asserting that they transferred PNRs to third party companies and
government entities. According to the plaintiffs, the ECPA applied
because the airlines were transferring electronically stored PNRs
without passenger consent.124 In each of the cases, the lower courts
dismissed the complaints prior to trial. As such, it is still unclear as
to whether the ECPA can be applied to airlines' electronic data and,
if so, what remedies are appropriate.12 5
The status of the airline passenger class action cases shows the
deference courts give to governmental agencies when determining
the scope of American's unenumerated privacy rights. In the
drafting of each of these laws, individual privacy rights are often
trumped by any governmental need for security. This standard is
followed by the courts, which have been quick to give deference to
governmental security efforts by allowing governmental
wiretapping and granting immunity to companies that illegally
transfer third party data to the government even if they violate
statutorily protected privacy rights. When state security is at stake,
the courts have not granted individual citizens any redress for the
violation of their right. This enables the impermissible transfer of
personal data to continue without any reasonable regulation by the
government or checks by the courts.
VI. Differences in Domestic Privacy Laws
The U.S. and the EU are similar in their focus on domestic and
global state security and in maintaining strong privacy protections
for individual data. However, despite shared interests, fundamental
differences arise during state efforts to apply their domestic laws
and standards toward an international agreement. In terms of the
ATSA, increased threats to domestic and global state security have
resulted in collective and large-scale information gathering. The
collection and analysis of individual traveler's data, however,
necessarily intrudes on their personal property. Thus, the state is
forced to balance between maintaining state security and protecting
individual data privacy.
In passing the ATSA, the U.S. committed itself to preserving
domestic and global state security over individual privacy rights.
124. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
125. See, e.g., supra note 67.
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Following 9-11, the U.S. has been more domestically focused on
maintaining state security. As shown in Roe and Griswold, the
government is permitted to trump individual privacy rights when
faced with a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly
tailored toward the state goal. Here, the governmental interest in
state security, especially as it relates to air traffic, is highly
compelling. The question becomes whether the personal data fields
demanded under the ATSA are narrowly tailored enough to meet
the requirements of the Supreme Court. It can be argued that much
of the data sought, such as meal preferences or seat assignments, are
not, on their own, strong predictors as to whether an individual
traveler is a terrorist. However, U.S. intelligence agencies argue that
having all the data allows them to more effectively anticipate the
risks posed by individual passengers. Thus, in light of the domestic
laws regarding individual privacy along with the civil cases
regarding air travel, this may be sufficient for the courts to hold that
the ATSA is sufficiently narrow to warrant intrusion into individual
privacy.
For the EU, however, finding a balance between state security
and individual data privacy is more difficult due mostly to a
different tradition of privacy laws and safeguards. The EU statutes
place a different balance on state security and individual privacy.
Like the U.S., the EU is highly dedicated to maintaining state
security; however, it must occur within the context of protecting
individual privacy and data. As discussed in Section II, both Section
6 and 8 of the Directive require that all personal data must be
collected and safeguarded, even upon transmission to a legitimate
third party, for "specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes" 126 and is
retained for only a specific and limited time period. In addition, the
collection of sensitive passenger data, such as race, religion, or
political affiliations, is prohibited unless it is for public security,
defense, or state security purposes, is "narrowly related to the
reason [the data is] collected [and] strict retention guidelines are
ensured."127 Thus, under EU law, the collection and transmission of
personal data must be supported by informed and legitimate
suspicion.128
Moreover, the collection and retention of individual data fields
126. Council Directive, supra note 4, art. 6.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
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under the ATSA is neither specific nor narrowly tailored enough to
satisfy EU law. Third party data transfers must abide by the EU's
strong domestic privacy protections unless faced with a legitimate
and identifiable security threat.129 This requirement is not met
through the ATSA, which requires the whole-scale collection of all
passenger data, regardless of the existence of any credible threat.130
Under EU's standard, the ATSA does not provide enough
protections because there are few limiting constraints on the
collection and use of sensitive data.'31 For the EU, the protection of
private data, unless necessitated by a legitimate security threat,
trumps that of state security.132 This position is drastically different
than that taken by the U.S. courts and legislature, which have
chosen to maintain security - even when the threats are ambiguous
and not credible - over individual privacy rights.3 3
VII. ATSA and International Efforts to Bridge Different
Domestic Approaches to Privacy
Even with dichotomous views on privacy, the EU and U.S. have
needed to compromise to gain international compliance with
important domestic laws, such as the ATSA.
A. History of Compliance
Prior to the enactment of the ATSA, the U.S. and European
Commission began developing appropriate guidelines for third
party transfer of personal data. In 2000, the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the European Commission developed "Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles" in order to facilitate data transfer within the
confines of the Directive requirements. 34 Under the Safe Harbor
129. Id. art. 13(l)-(2).
130. See supra note 3, § 44909 (where no requirement of a threat is enumerated as
a prerequisite to the collection of PNRs).
131. European Parliament News Release, Transfer of Passenger Data Illegal Says
Court Uune 7, 2006) available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20060606ST008687&language=BG. See also
Giovanni Buttarelli, Promoting Freedom and Democracy: a European Perspective,
European Data Protection Supervisors' Group (May 20-22, 2004), http://epic.org/
privacy/intl/buttarelli-052104.html.
132. Council Directive, supra note 4.
133. See supra note 3, § 44909.
134. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L215) 7-47 (EC) (pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
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Principles, U.S. companies agreed to comply with and be bound by
principles that fit the Directive requirements. If U.S. companies
agree, they are bound to 1) provide "clear and conspicuous" notice
of the purpose, use, and transfer of personal data; 2) provide
individuals an opportunity to "opt out" of data transfers to third
parties; 3) ensure data transfers to third parties occur only to other
organizations that abide by data privacy principles; 4) take
"reasonable" protections against data "loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction"; 5)
ensure "personal information must be relevant for the purposes for
which it is to be used"; 6) allow individuals access to their personal
data and correct or delete any inaccuracies; and 7) have an effective
method for ensuring compliance with these principles. 135
B. First International Agreement and Differing Privacy Law
Following the passage of the ATSA in 2001, the U.S. and EU
began negotiating to ensure that EU airlines could comply with both
U.S. law and the EU Directive. In June 2002, the U.S. Customs
Service published interim rules for implementing ATSA
requirements, which allowed the U.S. unfettered and unlimited
access to EU passenger data. Under the interim Agreement, the U.S.
could access EU records for any "legitimate law enforcement
purposes" including those beyond fighting terrorism. 36 Since there
were no enumerated protections or limits on the access, collection,
or storage of EU passenger data, the interim rules were met with
extreme resistance from the European Parliament, Data
Commissioners and privacy groups.137 The primary complaint was
that the agreement was too broad and lacked any of the protections
and safeguards necessary for compliance with the EU Directive.138
In response, the EU Working Party rejected the interim agreement
and instead called for a formalized agreement that reduced the
fields of data collected, excluded the collection of "sensitive" data,
adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbor privacy principles and
related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce).
135. U.S. Department of Commerce, Annex I: Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, July
21, 2000, http://www.export.gov/safeHarbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.
136. Digital Civil Rights in Europe, Data Protection Recommendations on PNR, July
2, 2003, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number12/pnr (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
137. Id.
138. Working Party Opinion 6/2002, Report on Transmission of Passenger Manifest
Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, WP 66, Oct. 24, 2002.
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limited data retention times, limited the data use solely to fighting
terrorism, and ensured effective enforcement of passenger privacy
rights. 39
Consequently, U.S. authorities postponed the application of the
ATSA until February 5, 2003. However, the U.S. refused to waive
the penalties imposed on airlines that failed to comply with the
ATSA requirement for electronic access; thus, a number of large
airlines in the EU have granted the U.S. authorities access to their
PNR data. 140 The EU and U.S. continued negotiations until "U.S.
Deputy Customs Commissioner Douglas Browning and officials of
the European Commission agreed to give the custom officials direct
access to the personal data of passengers flying to, from and
through the U.S." 141 In exchange, the U.S. Customs Department
made broad concessions 142 and promised to at least "respect the
principles of the Data Protection... as long as these principles don't
stand in the way of the secret services." 143 Specifically, the U.S.
agreed to heightened protections and reasonable limitations on the
collection of "sensitive personal data," which includes personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, and trade-union membership.144 This
modified agreement, known as the Passenger Name Record Deal
("PNRD"), 145 was only possible after the U.S. promised to respect
passenger privacy rights in accord with the EU Directive.
The PNRD was met with apprehension in the EU and, in order
to address many of the concerns, the EU Working Party issued the
139. Id.
140. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04 European Parliament v. Council of the
European Union, 2006 E.C.R. at 33.
141. Digital Civil Rights in Europe, USA gets direct access to European passenger
data, Feb.26 2003, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3/pnr (last visited Feb.
17, 2009).
142. See also Annex: Undertakings of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection and the United States Transportation Security Administration, May 22, 2003,
available at http://ec.europa.eu (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
143. Id.
144. Commission Directorate General for External Relations, European Union Fact
Sheet: Passenger Name Record, 2, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external-relations (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
145. Jaime Jansen, Europe Court Strikes Down US-EU Airline Passenger Records




Working Party Opinion 4/2003.146 In the Opinion, the Working
Party identified areas where the U.S. needed to improve in order to
meet the adequacy standard set by the Directive.147 The EU agreed
with the U.S. that "the fight against terrorism is both a necessary
and valuable element of [democracy]." However, the EU does not
agree that security should come at the expense of fundamental
individual rights.148 The need for internal domestic security was
unable to trump the privacy rights enumerated in the Directive,
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.149 Consequently, any "limitations to fundamental
rights and freedoms regarding the processing of personal data in the
EU should take place only if necessary in a democratic society and
for the protection of public interests exhaustively listed in those
instruments." 5 0 As such, the Working Party rejected the PNRD as
insufficient and called for proportionality in all areas of U.S. data
collection, storage and transfer, thereby increasing transparency,
heightening protections of individual privacy rights, limiting data
collection and transfer, and ensuring that the U.S. data
methodologies were compatible with EU privacy laws.'5 '
Nevertheless, on May 17, 2004, the European Council adopted
Decision 2004/496/EC ("the Council Decision"), which authorized
the Council President to sign the PNRD agreement with the U.S. 5 2
The decision to accept the PNRD was supported by the European
Commission, but it was against the advice of the European
Parliament, 5 3 which argued that the PNRD violated the civil
146. Working Party Opinion 11070/03/EN, Report on the Level of Protection
ensured in the US for the Transfer of Passengers' Data, WIP 78 (June 13, 2003), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp78_en.
pdf.
147. 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83.
148. See Digital Civil Rights, supra note 136, at 3.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 4; see also supra note 18.
151. See supra note 136, at 8-10.
152. Commission of the European Communities, Recommendation from the
Commission to the Council for an Authorisation to Open Negotiations for an Agreement
with the United States of America on the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) Data to
Prevent and Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Including Organised Crime, 2,
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/ jun/eu-usa-pnr-com-
negotiation.pdf.
153. See also News Release, European Parliament, Air passenger data: MEPs look
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liberties of passengers under the Directive by allowing third country
transfers without adequate protections. 154
The PNRD became a power struggle between the EU branches.
For years, the European Parliament had been successfully asserting
greater powers vis-A-vis the other two branches, namely the Council
and the Commission. The PNRD lawsuit represented an effort by
the Council and the Commission to gain greater powers in foreign
relations. 55 As such, the EU Parliament, angered by the adoption of
the PNRD, challenged the authority of the Council and the
Commission to render the agreement effective under internal law.
The Parliament brought suit in the European Court of Justice and
challenged institutional policies largely unrelated to the substance
of the PNRD.
D. European Court of Justice Strikes Down the First Agreement
The PNRD was criticized as being without adequate legal basis.
As a result, the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice
called for its annulment. 5 6 Actions for annulment were brought to
the European Court of Justice, under Article 230 EC, on July 27,
2004.157 The EU Parliament challenged the PNRD claiming it was an
ultravires action that breached fundamental principles of the
Directive, fundamental rights, and the principle of
proportionality.158
In its ruling, the European Court of Justice focused on legal
authority and did not address the privacy implications of the
passenger data transfers. 59 The Court addressed only the first
to the future (June 7, 2006), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
154. See supra note 26.
155. Francesca Bignami, European Court of Justice Strikes EU-US Agreement on
PNR Data, Concurring Opinions, May 31, 2006, http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2006/05/european-court.html. See also Council Decision, supra note
147 at 1. See also supra note 153.
156. Electronic Privacy Information Center, EU-US Airline Passenger Data
Disclosure, http://epic.org/privacy/intl/ passenger.data.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2008).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 50.
159. The Court found that based on the Directive, the PNRD concerned matters
that go to the core of national sovereignty and therefore the EU was more
constrained by Member States and lacked the power to enter into the PNRD
agreement. The Court left it open, however, for a new agreement to be formed that
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argument and found that "Article 3(2) of the Directive, relating to
the exclusion of activities which fall outside the scope of
Community law, was infringed."160 In other words, the Court found
that the EU did not have the power, under their constitutional rules,
to enter into the agreement.161  Article 3(2) of the Directive
determines the scope of privacy rights and states that the Directive
does not apply to "activity which falls outside the scope of
Community law... [and] to processing operations concerning
public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-
being of the State when the processing operation relates to State
security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal
law." 62 Since the PNRD framework "was dictated by public
authorities, and amounted to processing operations concerning
public security, the Court held that the EU Commission lacked legal
competence under the Directive to address public and state security
issues."163
The EU Court of Justice held that the EU Council and
Commission overstepped their political boundaries and that
therefore the PNRD between the U.S. and EU was invalid. 64 In
accord with its findings, the Court issued a denunciation which
nullified the PNRD effective September 30, 2006.165 In not
addressing privacy directly, the Court left open the possibility that a
new agreement, which did not rely solely on the Directive, could be
valid under EU law.
E. Second International Agreement and Continuing Domestic
Privacy Tensions
In response, the U.S. and EU modified and adopted a new
passenger data transfer agreement, which was signed by the EU in
June 2007.166 The 2007 agreement struck a balance between the U.S.
was not based solely on the Directive. Bignami, supra note 155.
160. See supra note 153, at 51.
161. Bignami, supra note 155.
162. See supra note 4, at art. 3(2).
163. See supra note 134.
164. Nicola Clark, European Court Bars Passing Passenger Data to U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2006/05/30/world/
30cnd-air.html.
165. Official Journal of the European Union, C 165/1, Volume 49, 15 July 2006,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.douri=OJ:C:2006:165:SOM:en:HTML.
166. See Council Note: Presidency to Council 2005/0202 (CNS), June 28, 2007.
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need for security and the EU privacy rights. The new agreement
called for the data collected by U.S. authorities to be reduced from
thirty-four to only nineteen data fields, including name, contact
data, payment details, and itinerary information.167 In addition, the
data collected and processed would be treated in "accordance with
applicable U.S. laws, constitutional requirements, and without
unlawful discrimination, in particular on the basis of nationality and
country of residence." 168 Thus, EU citizens are afforded protections
consistent with the FOIA and the Privacy Act of 1972, including
increased transparency and the ability to obtain and correct
inaccurate data. Although the new agreement does not extend EU
citizens the full protections of the Privacy Act,169 it does allow the
EU and U.S. to share the active monitoring of programs, policies,
and compliance with either party's domestic laws.170 Under the new
agreement, the EU was assured that sufficient safeguards were in
place; thus allowing airlines in member countries to transfer
passenger data to the U.S.
The new agreement addressed many of the EU concerns and, to
a large degree, was supported by the U.S. government. The U.S.
government took active steps to support the new agreement. For
instance, following the formalization of the second agreement, the
"Senate Commerce committee passed new legislation that would
promote inbound travel by foreigners" and "the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, along with congressional leaders and industry
representatives, were discussing the latest efforts to collect biometric
information from both inbound and outbound international
travelers."171
Yet, even with Congress and numerous federal agencies in
support, the new agreement quickly failed. On February 11, 2008,
President George W. Bush flouted the new agreement and
demanded increased passenger information with the promise to
restrict U.S. airspace, unless an expanded range of data was
167. See supra note 134, at art. 5.
168. Agreement on the processing and transfer of passenger name record
("PNR") data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), U.S.-EU, June 28, 2007 at 4.
169. See supra note 147, at 2.
170. Id.
171. David Jonas, U.S. Seeks to Tighten Int'l Air Security While Promoting Inbound




provided. 172 This destroyed the 2007 agreement and, as of August
2008, no new agreement has been produced.
VIII. ATSA and Instituting International Privacy
Agreements
The different domestic constraints have impacted the ability of
the U.S. and EU to negotiate an effective international privacy
agreement. The U.S. and EU share the same goals of advancing
state security and protecting individual rights; however, they cannot
agree on how to achieve these goals within the requirements of the
ATSA. Finding a way to implement international agreements that
are consistent with domestic law is fundamental to ensuring that
domestic and global state security is preserved.
Thus far, the negotiations surrounding the ATSA have failed
because neither side is able to conform to domestic legal and
security requirements. The U.S. needs increased security and the
assurance that the EU will aid in intelligence gathering to minimize
the risk of any potential future attacks. For the EU, the effort is to
minimize the reduction of individual privacy protections while
ensuring that any data transferred to the U.S. is protected in
accordance with EU standards. The effect of these domestic
constraints is evidenced in the 2007 agreement. There, the U.S.
demanded a more limited PNR transfer and agreed to abide by
some EU privacy protection guidelines. In exchange, the EU agreed
to make U.S. privacy law and protections the foundation for
international PNR transfers. This, however, was domestically
problematic because it would subject EU citizens to more relaxed
U.S. privacy laws, which might violate the EU Directive and
fundamental EU liberties. However, it would have an impact
internationally because if the EU was to fail to comply with U.S.
demands, then it would impact international travel, international
relations, and airline revenue.
Although the negotiated positions appear diametrically
opposed, in terms of the ATSA, the primary problem appears to be
embedded in different domestic understandings of when a law is
narrowly tailored enough to warrant intrusion into individual
172. Ian Traynor, Bush Orders Clampdown on Flights to the U.S., The Guardian,
Feb. 11, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/11/usa.theairline
industry.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
rights. Thus, in order for the U.S. and EU to successfully negotiate,
they must discuss ways to tailor the reach of the ATSA in ways that
are acceptable to both parties. One possibility is to have the U.S.
institute a more transparent collection, transmission, and retention
program for ATSA-collected materials. During their negotiations,
the EU expressed reservations about how passenger data was
collected and the length of retention. The U.S. was unwilling to
provide many details to quell the EU concerns; thus, with more
transparency, the EU could be more willing to participate in
intelligence gathering.
A second possibility is to make the collection and analysis of
global terrorism a shared responsibility. Although this would
modify the demands of the ATSA in some respects, it would result
in increased and more effective risk analysis. Under the Directive,
individual data collection and sharing is drastically limited, except
for other EU members. Thus, with shared responsibility, there is the
opportunity for the EU to analyze passenger data and only transmit
data that represents a legitimate risk to security to the U.S.
Through improved collaboration, the U.S. and the EU would be
able to meet their respective domestic interests while enhancing
global security through increased communication, data sharing, and
voluminous intelligence gathering. For the U.S., increased
collaboration would reduce some of the burden on the U.S. to collect
and analyze large amounts of data quickly. In addition, global
collaboration, especially in the realm of international terrorism,
would help preempt global threats to state security. Also,
collaboration with the EU could help quell some of EU concerns
about data safeguards and, perhaps, persuade the EU to provide
more data over time. The EU needs would be met because, with
greater transparency and involvement, they could ensure that the
necessary safeguards were in place to satisfy their domestic
regulations.
A third possibility would be to shift the focus of the discussion
away from the dichotomy of state security versus individual rights
and onto human security. Under the theory of human security, state
security is not at odds with personal freedoms, such as privacy.
Instead, human security and national security should be, and often
are, mutually reinforcing.173 The methods employed focuses on
173. The Human Security Report, 2005, What is Human Security?, The Human
Security Centre, available at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php.
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"preventive diplomacy, conflict management and post-conflict
peace-building" through increased collaboration in order to
promote equitable economic development.1 74 One of the main
methods for increasing human security is to increase international
collaboration and information sharing, in order to reduce
misunderstandings and promote dialogue.175  This possibility
suggests that the best way to maximize national and international
security is to increase collaboration between the U.S. and EU
regardless of the requirements of domestic laws. Instead of the goal
being state security or individual privacy, the state interest shifts
toward improving the overall human condition, which results in
increased security for all.
IX. Conclusion
The U.S. and EU share similar interests in state security and
personal liberties, and these similar interests have influenced the
development of their respective political and legal systems.
Although similar on many fronts, the U.S. and EU have
implemented fundamentally different domestic laws. In terms of
domestic legislation and case law, the U.S. and EU are constrained
in very different ways. Especially after 9-11, the U.S. has become
more concerned with maintaining state security, even at the risk of
encroaching on personal privacy rights. The U.S. federal
government, as evidenced in the recent legislation and case law, has
focused largely on increasing state security. In the U.S., privacy
rights are unenumerated and inexplicitly tied to abortion, which
makes them easier to trump. To the contrary, the EU has a long
history of protecting personal data unless a legitimate and
recognizable threat to state security exists. In the EU, privacy rights
are enumerated and tied to theories of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Thus, it is significantly more difficult for the
EU Parliament or courts to establish any binding precedent that
allows for the subrogation of privacy. This note has analyzed the
differences between U.S. and EU privacy laws and has shown how
these differences have impacted efforts to develop an international
174. Human Security Report Project, Human Security Explained, http://www.
hsrgroup.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=344&temid=69 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
175. Human Security Centre, The Human Security Report 2005: Overview 9
(2005), http://www.humansecurityreport.info/ HSR2005_PDF/Overview.pdf.
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agreement regarding the ATSA. Although no agreement has yet
been achieved, the situation is not hopeless. With some minor
alternations to their perspectives, the deadlock can be broken and
the U.S. and EU can move toward securing international security
within domestic constraints.
